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‘Peeling back the mask’: Sociopathy and the rhizomes of the EU food 
industry.  
 
Abstract 
This article examines the EU food industry (apropos of the 2013 ‘Horse Meat Scandal’) applying the notion of 
sociopathy which has hitherto been confined to analyses of corporate banking and insurance (for example, 
Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012, Thomas, 2013). In the ‘underground’ of the EU meat industry we 
encounter sociopaths nurtured not only by the rhizomes of its industrial con, but also by collective consumer 
apathy:  Despite a pervasive culture of food fraud – with at least 1305 different ingredient adulteration cases 
since 1980- there is little criminological examination of the culture and environment of the everyday, 
‘harmless’, sociopaths present in the tributaries of the EU food supply. More than merely mapping the food 
industry sociopath, our overall aim is to contribute an interdisciplinary reading of the processes which sustain 
and reproduce his kind. 
Introduction 
When, on January14th 2013, the results of Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests carried out by 
the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) on frozen economy beef burgers found in 
European supermarkets (Tesco, Aldi, Iceland and Lidl) proved they contained up to 29% 
horse DNA, there was an unprecedented public outcry: Consumers wanted to know what 
kind of evil made a human pollute another’s basic necessity and, more importantly, how 
such contamination had slipped past existing oversight frameworks. As it has become 
clearer since, the 2013 meat scandal was a complex case of food fraudi involving multiple 
producers and suppliers across Europe (Lawrence, 2013). In this article, we seek a 
criminological exploration of the intricacies of this food adulteration network using the 
notion of sociopathy- which has hitherto been the province of organisational and business 
studies (Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al., 2012). Our intention is not merely to identify or 
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even discuss the worldview of the sociopath but to make an interdisciplinary reading of the 
corporate criminal, deploying concepts hitherto confined to analyses of the subjects of 
psychological experiments, or to large corporations in popular media. In the end we aim to 
test the fit of the notion of corporate sociopathyii as a criminological tool. 
There are two justifications for this: First, there is discernible dearth of criminological 
literature on corporate sociopathy outside the traditional scope of large, multilevel, financial 
organisations. There has been little examination of how we, as a society, are affected by the 
seemingly ‘harmless’ sociopaths who may be the main drivers of mid-level business, 
specifically in the food industry (Basham, 2011; Boddy, 2013). In general, there is 
surprisingly little criminological focus on food crime, despite the fact that the 20th century 
has played host to various forms of food scares from things as mild as meat mislabelling to 
dioxin poisoning – with at least 1305 different ingredient adulteration cases since 1980 
(Moore et al. 2012). Secondly, we believe that within the tapestry of organisational culture 
analysis, there are critical strands which should enhance critical criminology: Although 
criminological attention is shifting to so-called ‘victimless crimes’ contemporary analyses of 
psychopathy (mostly in organisational behaviour literature) limit their purview to 
occupations such as banking, law or stock brokerage, perhaps because of the inherent 
conditions favourable to psychopathy within these career paths (Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar 
et al. 2012, Thomas, 2013).  
This opens an interdisplinary window apropos of psychology, for example: The notion of 
sociopathy- heavily based on the work of Hervey Cleckley’s (1941) iconic, ‘Behind the mask 
of sanity’, is a widely-cited psychological condition, with literature surrounding its causes 
and symptoms developing with time. In popular culture, ‘sociopathy’ and ‘psychopathy’ are 
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commonly used interchangeably- often divided using skewed definitions, namely due to the 
presumption that psychopathy is attributable to violent, murderous behaviour, whilst 
sociopathy being the ‘diet’ or non-violent versioniii. In tandem, while we shall use the terms 
interchangeably in most places, sociopath/sociopathy shall be used in specific reference to 
antisocial personalities whose behaviour is a consequence of social or familial dysfunction 
and, psychopath/psychopathy in reference to people/or behaviour resulting from a defect 
or aberration rather than an aspect of upbringing. 
Along this line we shall claim two related things: First, all corporations (size 
notwithstanding) culturally nurture sociopathic tendencies amongst their successful players 
(Pech & Slade, 2007; Boddy, 2013, Basham, 2011). Mutatis mutandis, the meat scandal 
should be read as a toxic mix of this sociopathiciv culture with poor institutional oversight 
and what others- for example Doherty et al. (2013) - have referred to as the ‘white spaces’ 
of capitalism: A market driven by demand (for cheap alternatives) will inevitably result in 
food fraud or adulteration- unless regulatory behaviour can enforce interpretations of the 
law favourable to its obedience. Our emphasis, however, is that so-called ‘looseness in 
enforcement’ is not enough to account for the  prevalence of food fraudv (Gallagher & 
Thomas, 2010); other factors- including deliberate operational cultures- must be in place to 
circumvent existing frameworks of regulation, precisely because of sociopathic incentive for 
such circumvention.  
The rhizomes of the European meat market  
Following widespread tests by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) across supermarkets and 
wholesalers throughout the United Kingdom in 2013, revelation was made of a significant 
proportion of equine DNA in ready meals and prepared foods (such as burgers, lasagnes, 
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meat pies) that were in circulation by wholesalers labelled as beef products (Lawrence, 
2013a). As an example, meatballs sold in the Swedish retailer Ikea, frozen beef mince in the 
British supermarket chain ASDA, lasagnes in the Findus (popular economy ready meal 
brand) line and Burger King’s ‘Whoppers’ all tested positive for equine DNA (BBC, 2013b)vi. 
Since none of the food items were made in-house at any of the retail chains, the suppliers 
were mostly traced back to Silvercrest (county Monaghan) and Dalepak (Yorkshire)- both 
companies belonging to the Anglo-Irish Beef Processor (ABP) Group (Lawrence, 2013a). Prior 
to the revelation of the scandal, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland (FSAI) had carried out 
official tests aimed at detecting equine DNA in products made by the heavyweights of Irish 
beef processing. This report, in which tests had revealed 29% horse DNA in meat in burgers 
made for Tesco by Silvercrest, was described by the FSAI as the equivalent of a lottery 
jackpot (Lawrence, 2013a: 4)vii.  
The FSAI report, initially treated with political scepticism, nonetheless managed to arouse 
public attention, mostly because the pricing of beef products did not make economic sense. 
At the time of the scandal, the price of beef on commodity markets had achieved record 
highs, as there was a marked spike in the price of fresh meat in UK in 2008, coinciding with 
the financial crisis, which increased every subsequent year, doubling in price by autumn of 
2011 (Lawrence, 2013a)viii. At the time of the scandal, the raw material for a decent beef 
burger cost at least £3.80 per kilo on the whole sale markets. That was the price of beef trim 
of the sort that would make a burger that was 85-90% lean from reasonable quality offcuts,’ 
(Lawrence, 2013a, p.12) and this was before factoring in anything of the manufacturer’s and 
retailer’s labour, energy, transport, and capital costs. Lawrence (2013a) estimates that for 
this kind of decent mince, a ‘quarter pounder’ burger would cost at least 43p; at the time of 
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the scandal, frozen economy burgers, sold at £1 for a pack of eight (approximately 12p per 
thin burger or 25p per quarter pound). (According to the Trading Standards Service (2013), 
for beef, lamb or mixed meat burgers, the minimum weight of meat, of the named meat in 
its packaging name must be equal to 62% of its total weight; for economy burgers, 47% of 
the total weight; while hamburgers necessitate 62% of the total weight in either a mix of 
beef and pork or pure pork. On the other hand, products like pies and pastries only require a 
minimum of 10% and 6% respectively in total weight of the finished product (Trading 
Standards Service, 2013.)) 
The meat industry in the EU- mostly due to the trade lax and vast difference in the cost of 
everything from livestock to labour and spices- is a convoluted network of supply and 
distribution chain, best described as a ‘rhizome’ (Lippens, 2001; Deleuze & Guattari (1987)): 
It is a complex, messy, multi-directional network of dealers at various levels; First, there are 
animal farmers and breeders. Some of these, namely the bigger, more commercially 
successful, slaughter their own livestock and sell the meat, whilst the rest transport the 
animals for slaughter to abattoirs, like Red Lion of Nantwich (Lawrence, 2013b). Secondly, 
there are the meat processors. These are companies- like Spanghero (France), Frigilunch 
Q.V. (Belgium), Willy Selton (Netherlands), and Norwest (Cheshire, England) - that separate 
the different cuts of meat from the animal and process the rest of it. Sometimes the 
processors also buy processed meat from other meat processors, mix it with meat from 
multiple suppliers or their own products and then supply different grades of processed meat 
to their buyers (Lawrence, 2013b; Traynor & Harding, 2013). Thirdly, there are ready meal 
producers; factories like Silvercrest, Comigel (Luxembourg), and Dalepak which usually  
purchase frozen mince blocks and make ready meals and other meat products like mince, 
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burgers, instant lasagne, bottled meat sauce, meat stock, pies and sausages (Lawrence, 
2013a).  
This delineation is misleading, however: At any one time, producers are concomitantly the 
processors or breeders and vice versa. The main aim of this rhizome is not just to maximise 
on the economies of scale- or to tap into operational comparative advantages- but 
something far more sinister as Lawrence (2013b) reveals apropos of the meat scandal: to 
eliminate all possibility of product traceabilityix, capitalising on legal loopholes. Meat 
traceability, as Shackell (2008) observes, is critical for the retention of identity from the time 
an animal is born to when it is presented to the consumer as a cut of meat. Traceability is 
not only important for food safety, but also for ethical/cultural reaons; the meat consumer 
should not only have confidence in the product- that it is what it is purported to be- but she 
should also not have to worry about likely side effects on their conscience (Shackell, 2008, 
p.2135). 
As the image below (adapted from Shackell, 2008) illustrates, however, traceability is more 
complex when corporate activity is transnational or cross-sectoral- in which case the 
traceability/audit trail between the farm and consumer can become circuitous, even when 
the routes taken are relatively linear. As a simple illustration, complication can arise when, 
say, Processor C- due to a lack in supply for a sudden seasonal increase in demand from 
Retailer 3- needs to purchase processed meat from Processor B, whom buys and mixes meat 
from Farm 3 and 4 (farm 3 might be from a different country) whilst the finished product 
sold by retailer 3 might be advertised as “all meat sourced from Farm 5 only.” 
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Schematic of a simple supply chain of pasture grazed beef (Shackell, 2008, p.2139) 
Along the above outlines, the Horse meat scandal exemplifies the complex rhizomic 
networks which supplied meat(s) to local supermarkets and familiar brands in Britain. The 
most prominent supply chain was, as reported by The Guardian (2013), one that led up to 
Tesco’s main supplier, Silvercrest- also the first name highlighted at the emergence of the 
scandal. The chain was traced back to a horse dealer, Laurence McAllister (see Guardian, 
2013): In October 2012, McAllister was caught smuggling cannabis in a consignment of sick 
and wounded horses and donkeys unfit for travel, (Lawrence, 2013c). Further investigation 
by the Ulster Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (USPCA) revealed the reason 
for the constant moving of unfit horses; since 2010, McAlister had been transporting horses 
from Northern Ireland into UK for disposal, but in most cases they were being sent to the 
Red Lion Abattoir in Nantwich, England (Lawrence, 2013a, p.27). The Red Lion 
slaughterhouse had already been under activist scrutiny prior to the horsemeat scandal 
explosion: A group called The Hillside Animal Sanctuary had planted hidden cameras in the 
abattoir and recorded Polish workers violating other animal cruelty regulations before 
slaughtering the horses (Lawrence, 2013c).  
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Apart from the activists, the abattoir had also been under FSA scrutiny for some time owing 
to tests that the horses processed by them turned out positive for a drug that had been 
banned from entering the food chain (Ricca-Smith, 2013). The drug, known as ‘Bute’ or 
Phenylbutazone, is not allowed in the food chain and findings of this substance in 
horsemeat are the result of illegal entry into the food chain of carcasses of horses treated 
with the substancex. According to EU legislation, treatment of horses with phenylbutazone 
must be recorded in their “horse passport”xi, resulting in the definitive exclusion of the 
animals from slaughter for human consumption (EFSA, 2013). This was clearly not the case 
considering that sick and injured animals were being transported, especially when some of 
them tested positive for Bute. Rather, the horses bore falsified and fraudulent passports. 
The plant was later ordered to halt all slaughter whilst under investigation. Investigations 
proved, however, that the slaughtered, frozen horse meat was allegedly packed and labelled 
legally as horse.  
As it turned out, processed consignments from the Red Lion were subsequently delivered to 
a Dutch meat processor, Willy Selton, in Oss, Netherlands- yet another player along the 
rhizome. (Selton had been ordered by Dutch authorities to recall 50,000 tonnes of meat 
distributed in the previous two years to more than 500 companies across Europe, because 
he was unable to show records of its origins. (Lawrence, 2013a, p.29)). Willy Selton is 
important to the concept of sociopathy because of the deliberate effort his factory put into 
destroying meat traceability. As Lawrence (2013a) reveals, Polish migrant workers at 
Selton’s were often offered huge bonuses- paid in cash to avoid audit trails- for working in 
the middle of the night defrosting frozen meat, up to a year old, that was rotten. Some of 
the workers had to cover their mouths with shirts while some suffered indigestion due to 
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the odour. They had to grind up this old meat with horse meat and newer beef, only to 
repack it as fresh beef for sale. Following this revelation Selton was arrested by Dutch 
authorities for fraud allegations. (Lawrence, 2013c)  
Another example of this rhizome is Norwest Food, in Cheshire, England. As a meat processor 
(and seafood trader across the EU) Norwest sourced the meat from Selton to the ABP food 
processors (Lawrence, 2013d). Lawrence links all the players at this point in the network 
thus: 
‘the owners of Norwest, which supplied ABP with meat from Selton, included Ray MacSharry Jr, son of 
the former Irish agricultural minister of the same name. Ray MacSharry Jr. had worked for Goodman’s 
[then] AIBP during the period investigated by the beef tribunal, and then left at the end of 1992,’ 
(Lawrence, 2013a, p.47). 
A handful of sociopaths 
As these examples reveal, the European meat processing industry is dominated by a handful 
of players. The Irish ABP Food Group, (parent group of Silvercrest and Dalepak) is one of the 
major players- perhaps the largest, slaughtering around 1 million cattle a year.  ABP employs 
2500 people in Ireland and 8000 throughout Britain, Netherlands and Poland, with an 
annual turnover of £2.5 billion and annual profits of £80 million. Although, as a private, 
unlimited company, it does not publish accounts, it is linked to the ‘Irish Beef Baron’, Larry 
Goodman- a business tycoon who, in the 1980’s came under fire from the Irish public and 
the Beef Tribunal for meat fraud involving passing of poorer cuts of beef as prime beef. 
Since the tribunal failed to prove that Larry Goodman made the decisions relevant to the 
fraud allegations – he blamed rogue managers and laid them off subsequently- he received 
his subsidies and by 1999 gained full control over his “empire” again.  
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But Goodman is not new to controversy:  he has also been linked to one of the biggest 
political corruption scandals in the Republic of Ireland’s history beef exports to Iraq to feed 
Saddam Hussein's army. As an example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saddam defaulted on 
£100m worthy of debts owed to Goodman’s companies. It has been additionally alleged that 
Goodman had been favoured inappropriately in being underwritten with insurance paid for 
by the Irish government- although a tribunal ruled that Charles Haughey, the then 
Taoiseach, had not made decisions improperly, but instead because he believed it was in the 
national interest to support one of Ireland's most important economic sectors.’ (Lawrence, 
2013e). It was no surprise then that, in 2013, ABP was linked to the scandal in which its 
supplies to top supermarkets like Lidl, Aldi, Iceland and Tesco revealed high quantities of 
equine DNA. As in the past, however, Goodman unsurprisingly claimed innocence by 
blaming “rogue managers’, before laying them off and selling the Silvercrest factory – which 
has since hired new managers and reclaimed the lost contract to supply Burger King 
(Lawrence, 2013c).  
Goodman’s companies are not the only existing supply chain involved, however. Draap 
Trading Ltd, a Cyprus registered trading company, is another example. Ran from the 
Antwerp area of Belgium, it is owned by an offshore vehicle based in the British Virgin 
Islandsxii. Jan Fasen, a director of DRAAP Trading Ltd, is cited in Harding and Traynor (2013) 
as having confirmed that he bought a consignment of horsemeat from two Romanian 
abattoirs and sold it to French food processors after he had labelled it as ‘beef’. (Fasen was 
sentenced in January 2012 for deliberately marketing South American horsemeat as halal-
slaughtered Dutch beef and falsifying documents.) DRAAP’s involvement in the 2013 scandal 
was in the supply (together with a French company Spanghero) of various ready-meal 
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products, like the Findus lasagne products found in British supermarket chains- which arrive 
through its DRAAP’s franchise, Comigel. When the scandal broke, Draap insisted that the 
meat delivered to its Castelnaudary plant in southern France had arrived labelled ‘Beef’ but 
that Spanghero might have delivered a mixed beef mince product that contained horse 
meat to Comigel. 
Revisiting organisational psychopathy 
In popular culture, sociopathy and psychopathy are commonly used interchangeably- often 
divided using skewed definitions- mostly due to the presumption that psychopathy is 
attributable to violent, murderous behaviour, whilst sociopathy being the ‘diet’ or non-
violent  version. Over time, due to the breadth of the psychopathy spectrum, various sub-
theories and disorders have been drawn and connected to the disorder. However, in 1930, 
Partridge reviewed contemporary research and identified a subgroup (of psychopaths) for 
whom difficulty or refusal to adapt to the demands of society is the pathognomonic 
symptom, and he named this disorder “sociopathic personality” (Lykken, 2006). In similar 
vein, Clekley (1988) has documented several cases of individuals who possessed the core 
personality features observed in criminal psychopaths- such as egocentricity, lack of 
remorse, and superficial charm- yet manifested those traits in ways that did not result in 
criminal prosecution. He presented several cases of what he labelled as ‘incomplete 
manifestations or suggestions of the disorder’. Among these individuals were several 
prominent, high functioning members of society, including businessmen, physicians and 
ministers. Due to the fact that some psychopaths have tried to fit into society and make 
honest living, some have concluded that, 'certain psychopathic traits might in fact serve as 
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valuable personal assets in some professions, such as law, politics or business.’ (Hall & 
Benning, p.459). 
Robert Hare (cited in Boddy, 2006: 1462) has proposed a modified subset of Clekley's 
criminal checklist, catering to ‘organisational psychopaths’: Glib and superficially charming; 
a grandiose sense of self-worth; pathological liars; good at conning and manipulating others; 
no remorse about harming others; emotionally shallow, calculating and cold; callous and 
lacking in empathy; failing to take responsibility for town actions et cetera. By comparing 
special ops commandos, surgeons, business executives, and dangerous criminals, Dion 
(2009) has also laid out a ‘psychopathic personality map’ emphasizing ‘charm’, 
‘fearlessness’, ‘ruthlessness’, and a ‘laser-like focus’ on issues of interest to the psychopath: 
In the extreme, traits like these will land the psychopath in prison, but, judiciously applied, 
they may turn him into a hero or saint. 
Popular culture is actually replete with various versions of this psychopathic map: While 
many Wall Street traders crumble under their losses, The wolf of wall street brushes off 
failure and starts afresh the next day; where normal folks would shudder, the SEAL sniper 
calmly squeezes the trigger, et cetera. In psychological theory, some- such as the leading 
American psychologist, Robert Hare- have even claimed that psychopaths or sociopaths are 
four times more likely to be the head of a company than the person sweeping the floors.’ 
(See, Huston, 2013, p.59). Along this vein, recent studies by Akhtar et al. (2012) and 
McKenzie et al. (2007) on the relationship specifically between entrepreneurship and 
subclinical psychopathy have concluded that the psychological approach to 
entrepreneurship asserts that entrepreneurial activity is a function of individuals’ 
psychological make-up. Such studies emphasize the positive correlation between primary 
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psychopathy (emotional bluntness and callousness) and entrepreneurial abilities or 
tendencies.  
Of importance here is the view that corporations with few employees and often single 
decision makers are statistically more likely to nurture psychopathic traits than those with a 
large, diffused network of documented decision-making. This view has also been linked to 
the notion of ‘management failure’ which James Gobert has advanced as the key concept in 
understanding ‘corporate manslaughter’ and ‘corporate homicide’. Here, ‘Management 
Failure’ refers to behaviour which falls ‘far below’ what could reasonably have been 
expected under the circumstances; it does not refer to the failures of a company’s 
managers, but to the flawed way in which the company manages its affairs,’ (Gobert, 2008, 
p.75). As Gobert argues, a focus on ‘management failure’ should bring to perspective the 
reasons institutions/corporations become dangerous entities in society: If some of the 
people managing, or, more critically, the ones whom set the internal culture and focus of 
the organisation (or worse, industry) are psychopathic in nature, society will be 
haemorrhaging important values which are critical to its welfare and survival.  In that sense, 
the welfare and survival of society is undermined by organizational sociopathy in which 
corporations actively seek out monsters and nurture them with bonuses and praise.’ 
(Basham, 2011). Corporate sociopathy not only preserves and rewards psychopathic 
individuals (Pech & Slade, 2007; Basham, 2011), but also seems to seek them out as much as 
they desire the jobs that satisfy their carnal hunger; it’s a symbiotic process which advances 
the interests of the corporation and those of the psychopathxiii.  
Management failure and corporate amorality 
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Apropos of the 2013 horse meat scandal, one should go further here and suggest that the 
meat industry is characterized by a large number of psychopathic individuals who are tasked 
with managerial decisions calculated to maximize profit. The industry is characterized, not 
only by a rhizomic network of traders, but by a complex network which nurtures diffusion of 
responsibility and decision-making. Nonetheless, like other forms of organized criminality 
these decisions are only known or visible to a closely neat family of operatives. It is not 
surprising then that, behind the plethora of front-end suppliers, the entire industry is under 
the tight grip of shadowy dealers with family or political connections to each other.  This is 
what allowed the criminality to remain well hidden away from the unsuspecting public. 
Beside individual psychopathy, focus should also be on the ‘management failure’ of the 
retail chains: This failure is down to the drive to maximize profit, by driving down prices (and 
costs) in order to interest more customers. The logic is simple: If company A could produce 
lasagnes for 40p each and market them for a £1, they would be making the kind of profit 
that company B can only hope to achieve by having the same supplier, and so on. 
Domination of the cheap (but profitable) products by a handful of suppliers turns it into the 
interests of the retailers to nurture closer relations with the suppliers and to an extent to 
protect their sources. The ‘management failures’ here were not about compliance with the 
law, but rather poor oversight in the drive to maximise profits, encouraged by the fact that 
‘everyone else is doing it’. The economic recession of 2008 meant not only that more 
families had to rely on poorer quality but cheap food, but government laissre fairer in order 
to encourage economic growth. It also engendered a ‘survival for the fittest’ mentality 
among retailers to weather the storms of economic slump. In this conundrum we see the 
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psychopathic tendency to take risks, to make more and more profits, to outsmart everyone 
from regulators and customersxiv.  
Of course not every individual involved in unethical or questionably illegal corporate 
activities is a head-hunted psychopath; some more fluid personalities are moulded by the 
container they fill. By the demands of their socio-economical containers- mostly in the 
pursuit for money and success (Bakan, 2005)- some become operational sociopaths;  
‘smooth’, adroit at manipulating conversations to subjects they want to talk about, willing to 
put others down, accomplished liars, totally ruthless and opportunistic, calculating and 
without remorse (Boddy, 2006, p.1461).  
Amorality is a theme corporations often find themselves described by; unlike immorality, it 
is not a pathological desire to commit sadistic abuse of others due to a lack of empathy. 
Neither is it the need to function morally due to values one was raised with, it is simply 
calculating which action brings the most overall value. Substituting beef in burgers with 
horsemeat might be a risky activity, one may get fined and lose approximately X% in 
business if discovered, share prices could potentially drop, but the net profits will be £Y, 
which is substantial; therefore, commit meat adulteration. In such a case, if the projected 
loss in share price and market share was too risky, they would have just as easily stuck to 
more expensive beef, increased their prices and painted their walls with “fair trade” posters 
and commitments.  
Organization culture and sociopathy 
What this means is that we have to take an objective view of corporations themselves, and 
specifically their organisational culture, inorder to fathom the myriad ways in which they 
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fuel and/or nurture deleterious psychopathic  practices. The classic ‘one bad apple spoils the 
barrel’ scenario comes to mind:  One psycopath can ruin the rest of the actors within the 
organisational chain granted leeway. Under what conditons, however, does this first 
sociopath begin to form and mobilise a network? According to Roddick (2005) the critical 
moment is when decision makers remove themselves from the possibility of a relationship 
connection with their consumers (effectively  their victims, as Bakan (2005) points out). As 
Chirayath et al. (2002, cited in Dion, 2009: 437) correctly points out this may sometime be a 
mundane issue of entrapment in ‘doubtful, immoral or disloyal means that are used by 
competitors’. Afterall, business is the business of business and companies want employees 
that can deliver and reach (financial) organisational goals. Similarly, investors want returns 
on capital employed, and employees, including executives, want rewarding bonuses – which 
is only possible on high net profits. Punch reads this conundrum thus:    
‘The emphasis on goals, and the necessity to achieve organisational goals, may 
enhance practices where the ends are held to justify the means. As such, it could be 
argued that all organisations experience pressure to resort to illegal means of 
(acceptable) goal attainment,’ (Punch, 2000, p.255).  
What this means, for the horse meat scandal, is that, although the tabooxv of consuming 
horse meat may seem to explain public outrage over the scandal, it is precisely the 
intepretations of this panic which missed the real danger: How regulatory weaknesses is 
actually an aspect of widespread violation of consumerrights in European food markets. For 
illustration, consider these 3 examples: First, a third of the domestic Irish beef market 
consists of imports from Argentina and Brazil- where, unlike in Europe,  Zebu derived cattle 
is extensively used. In a test conducted by the Irish Farmers Association, 53 random beef 
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products of varying outlets were submitted for DNA analysis that resulted in 15 out of 53 
testing positive for Zebu specific alleles, indicating non-European origin: However, 12 out of 
the 15 samples were labelled as pure ‘Irish’ beef. (Shackell, 2008). Secondly, a third of fruit 
juices sampled were not what they claimed or had labelling errors; two contained additives 
that are not permitted in the EU- including brominated vegetable oil, which is designed for 
use in flame retardants and linked to behavioural problems in rats, at high doses (Lawrence, 
2014). Thirdly, in 2005, a batch of Worcestershire sauce was discovered to be contaminated 
with the toxic dye “Sudan 1”. Within a week the FSA identified 474 products – mostly soups, 
snacks, sauces and ready meals – containing the contaminated sauce contained additive 
sauces and stocks many of which were simplified on the labels as ‘spices’ that weren’t  
specified.  (Shackell, 2008).  
Corporate sociopathy and corporate white spaces 
It is probably crucial to note here that most available literature on corporate crime, 
organisational deviance, corporate psychopaths, or corporate culture that is reviewed here 
speaks of corporations with a high number of employees, namely entrepreneurial, profit 
driven businesses like investment banking or petroleum corporations. However, this article 
has concentrated on the various (corporate) actors along the ready meal supply chain, 
which bears a slightly different structure; with far less levels of management, far less 
empowered employees and no project groups. However, Lippens (2001, p.234) is correct 
apropos of organizational philosophy when he notes that 
‘Post-bureaucratic organisations tend to emerge as more or less loose clusters of 
ever-changing, ever-connecting, ever-disconnecting networks. Flexible networks are 
formed in order to be able to react quickly to internal, “internal” as well as 
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“external” problems. Networks are not just “internal”; sources on the alleged 
“outside” are part and parcel of post-bureaucratic organisational networks. The 
“outside, thus, is always potentially on the “inside” as well.’ 
The same goes for the space in-between networks: ‘this space and the resources therein, 
are always, at least potentially already within each of the networks.’ (Lippens, 2001, p.234). 
To revisit Shackell’s (2008) schematic above, the structures and networks found outside 
meat corporations are found inside and vice versa – therefore, the type of competition, 
power relations, symbiosis and comingling that may take place in more concentrated 
organisations with numerous levels of management and work groups, are sometimes 
present between several organisations that lack that structure. This rhizome is an aspect of 
what others (for example, Bakan (2005) have referred to as the ‘white spaces’ of late 
capitalism: the unexamined, unpoliced corporate feeding trough which only receives 
attention when something goes wrong publicaly. This space is also frequented and thrived 
on by many because it shields many from responsibility. Bakan (2005) points out that 
shareholders, directors and executives are all uniquely shielded from responsibility and all 
bear limited liability in corporate criminality: Where better to hide in (for everyone) during 
the frantic day-long witch hunts that usually ensue after an exposé than the white spaces 
between everyone’s responsibility? Apropos of this corporate ‘iron dome’ of protection 
Punch has remarked that  
‘the nature of the industry which encouraged covert alliances to cope with structural 
uncertainty, weak enforcement with co-opted regulators, a near collusive 
government engaged in prestigious projects and mindful of the importance of the 
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industry for the national economy, etc. – made it almost rational and reasonable to 
break the law.’ (Punch, 2008, p. 104) 
Thus, when coupled with the psychopathic tendencies that a corporation has, and the ability 
of directors and managers to become alter egos when they have their “management hats” 
on, we begin to see how these “actors” play the part in the monstrous corporate machine 
and remain independent from responsibility by recourse to ‘denial of responsibility’ (Sykes 
& Matza, 1957, p.667). This denial also allows one to sustain the conscience-duality split 
which Roddick bemoans in ‘business as unusual’: one is able to eat the cake and have it by 
rationalising and justifying deviant behaviour- but being able to do this not as autonomous 
individuals but as corporate actors by day and ‘normal people’ by night. People who are 
highly moral in their private lives ‘leave their consciences at home’ when they enter the 
portals of the firm’ (Punch, 2008, p.105)xvi.  
Conclusion 
This article should conclude by emphasizing that the 2013 meat fraud, like most exmaples of 
corporate sociopathy, is not attributable to a single actor. It is, rather, a result of complex 
and far-reaching lapses in regulation and consumer oversight. This lapse is itself nurtured by 
the existence of a complex rhizome of supply and distribution,  which is sometimes 
entertwined with organized criminality. That is to say, foood industry criminality thrives 
precisely in the interstices of corporate sociopathy and public oversight failure. Poor 
oversight is thus the first broken window we should address in order to reign in coporate 
sociopathy. How this is to be done is a different thing, altogether. In that sense the meat 
scandal was not such a scandal, after all: Given the low demand- and therefore low pricing- 
of horsemeat (along with its availability from various places within EU, and ease of moving 
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the horses around) the meat corruption could easily have been done anytime anywhere 
(and has probably been done repeatedly in the last century).  
Even then, given the risks involved, perhaps the temptation into large-scale adulteration has 
connections with the economic collapse of 2008 and subsequent squeeze on domestic 
spending. As we have seen elsewhere, where the post-2008 world has been marked by 
reduction in expendable income for families, it has also been characterised by corporate 
ruthlessness, with business upping the ante of salesmanship, recruiting the ‘the best and the 
brightest’ to survive and so on (Basham, 2011). Nonetheless, the claims of this article 
remain: While economic factors are important, the logic that takes a certain ‘breed’ to 
survive in the cut-throat environment characterised by perennial collapses in business 
empires (Hare, 1994; cited in Boddy, 2013) is mostly the decisive factor in food industry 
sociopathy.   
The main achievement of this article is that, while most available literature is mainly focused 
on corporate psychopathy and sociopathy in large corporations, we have attempted to 
show how these traits may also be embedded in an unusual place, and that this may even 
be more needful of attention than the usual sources of public moral panics. While the 
European populace was enraged by the sociopathy of the pre-2008 banking industry, 
another breed was busy replacing 1 ruminant with another in their 60% filler economy 
burgers, quite undetected. Therein is the rub: What both the financial crises and the meat 
scandal had in common is the lax regulation- despite the obsession on transparency (Abotts 
& Coles, 2013)-and the runway culture of rewarding psychopathy, most prominently under 
the bonus culture.  
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i ‘The UK Food Fraud Taskforce defines food fraud as, ‘deliberately placing on market, for financial 
gain, foods that are falsely described as otherwise intended to deceive the consumer.’ The common goal is to 
make money at the expense of the consumer, when legitimate goods are counterfeited and sold as the 
genuine article or genuine goods are adulterated with extraneous matter,’ (Gallagher & Thomas, 2010, p.347). 
ii The notion of Corporate sociopathy has been explored previously, in various industries and forms. Some, for 
example Lykken (2006) and Boddy (2013), emphasize individual sociopathy as the overidding aspect of their 
criminality while, for others, corporations are sociopaths (Bakan, 2005). 
iii One recent rendition of psycopathy is: ‘Psychopaths are people who, perhaps due to physical factors to do 
with abnormal brain connectivity and chemistry, especially in the areas of the amygdala and 
orbital/ventrolateral frontal cortex lack a conscience, have few emotions and display an inability to have any 
feelings, sympathy or empathy for other people.’ (Boddy, 2011, p. 256). 
iv It is important to note here that most relevant literature speak of corporate psychopaths –psychopathic 
individuals who work for corporations (Boddy 2006; 2010; Pech & Slade 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012). However, 
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some speak of sociopath corporations / corporate psychopathy in reference to organizations (even fictional 
entities) with psychopathic tendencies/ symptoms (Bakan, 2005). 
v ‘The UK Food Fraud Taskforce defines food fraud as, ‘deliberately placing on market, for financial 
gain, foods that are falsely described as otherwise intended to deceive the consumer.’ The common goal is to 
make money at the expense of the consumer, when legitimate goods are counterfeited and sold as the 
genuine article or genuine goods are adulterated with extraneous matter,’ (Gallagher & Thomas, 2010, p.347). 
  
vi The Guardian newspaper even ran a daily update of their list of meat processors that tested positive for 
equine DNA in their beef products: Rangeland Meats (County Monaghan), QK Meats (Kildare), Freeza Meats 
(Newry), and Eurostock (Craigavon) joined the rank of horse meat processing Irish plants (Lawrence, 2013b). 
vii For the purpose of the foregoing, we will not delve into the particulars or treatment of the prime cuts of 
beef like sirloin and rib eye, or on the treatment of additives and spices etc. Rather, we will focus on the parts 
that are ground into mince and processed fat – the meat that was central to the scandal – this is because these 
parts cost less and would fetch more value (or demand) when processed into a finished product (mince or 
ready meals) than sold in its natural form (Barlcay, 2012; Lawrence, 2013a; USDA, 2013). 
viii As Lawrence observes, the prices of beef burgers had continued to fall despite the fact that ‘there was a 
marked spike in the price of fresh meat in UK in 2008, coinciding with the financial crisis, and further spikes 
each year after that- menaing that, by autumn 2011, wholesale prices were nearly double what they had been 
in 2008.’ (Lawrence, 2013a, p.6). 
ix Shackell (2008) defines meat traceability as ‘the ability to maintain a credible custody of identification for 
animals or animal products through various steps within the food chain from the farm to the retailer,’ 
x As the FSA states, Phenylbutazone, (also known as Bute) is a commonly used medicine in horses ad is also 
prescribed to some patients who are suffering from a severe form of arthritis. But going by the levels of Bute 
that have previously been found in horse carcasses, a person would have to eat 500 - 600 one hundred per 
cent horsemeat burgers a day to get close to consuming a human's daily dose, not to mention that the drug 
passes through the system fairly quickly, so it is unlikely to build up in the human body (FSA, 2013). 
xi A horse passport, as the Department for Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) website mandates, is a mandatory 
document that every individual horse, pony or donkey owner must have with them at all times when with their 
animal; its purpose is to ensure horses treated with particular drugs don’t end up as food for people (Defra, 
2013). In theory, each animal is assigned one at birth and has its life veterinary history recorded in it. The 
passports follow the animals as they are traded, for whatever their purpose and can only be slaughtered when 
an official inspector at a slaughterhouse has checked the animal is free from banned drugs. (Lawrence, 2013a, 
p.21). 
xii The irony is that, “Draap” spelled backwards is the Dutch word for horse: Paard. 
xiii Braithwaite (1989) was right here in pointing out that when regulation is too strict, unreasonable, 
uncooperative, inflexibly rulebook-oriented, organised business subcultures of resistance develop. Once there 
is a climate of hostility between the business (industry) and regulators, the regulators lose capacity for 
informal control over the managers and how the business is run. 
xiv Maybe it took more sadistic genius to name a beef processor Draap, the reverse of Paard (horse in Dutch) 
and then supply “beef” mince internationally (Lawrence, 2013a)?  
 
xv According to Claridge (2013), horse meat once had its place in cuisine, much like it does in some countries 
like France and Iceland: At times horsemeat was a sacrificial food, and at others, it seemed to be ordinary 
food, but it was often rebuked by early Christian missionaries, most often in the context of ritual feasts. In an 
attempt to tried to dissuade people from eating horse, ‘In 723 Pope Gregory III issued a papal decree to St 
Boniface, explicitly forbidding the consumption of horse meat,’  (Claridge, 2013, P.32).  
 
xvi Does this not remind us of Sykes and Matza’s Techniques of neutralisation which allow the delinquent to 
shift the blame for their actions unto another party? In effect, the corporate delinquent approaches a "billiard 
ball" conception of himself in which he sees himself as helplessly propelled into new situations … deflecting 
blame attached to violations of social norms and its relative independence of a particular personality 
structure.’ (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p.667). 
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